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Islamophobia & Europhobia: Subaltern Discourse & Its Limits 
 
Peter O’Brien 
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This essay examines resistance to Islamophobia in the form of Europhobia 
produced by Islamists in Europe. By “Europhobia” I mean essentializing and distorting 
depictions of Europe (and the West) as thoroughly decadent, corrupt, and sadistic. In a 
process that I dub “inverted othering” Islamists emulate the discursive strategies of 
Islamophobes but invert their negative stereotypes of Muslims to portray (non-Muslim) 
Europeans as a menacing threat to the umma, or Arabic community. I spotlight three forms 
of “inverted othering” through systematic comparison of both Islamophobic and 
Europhobic discourse in Europe (including in cyberspace): Islamists invert the claim that 
Islam is incompatible with democracy by contending that European democracy is a 
hypocritical sham when it comes to equal rights for Muslims; Islamists invert the claim that 
Islam is misogynistic by arguing that Europe sexualizes and thereby represses women; 
Islamists invert the claim that Islam is inherently expansionist by insisting that Europe 
continues to harbor (neo)imperialist aims and attitudes toward the Islamic World. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The discipline of Islamophobia Studies is profoundly informed by social 
constructivism. It would make little sense to study Islamophobic discourse without 
presupposing constructivism’s central tenet that social reality is constructed. Indeed, studies 
abound that deftly analyze the multifaceted power of Islamophobic discourse to produce the 
stigmatized, essentialized, and mediatized Muslim Other who is made to appear to threaten 
European well-being in myriad ways (O’Brien 2015; Hafez 2014; Fredette 2014; Cesari 2013; 
Morgan and Poynting 2012; Bowen 2012; Lean 2012; Schneiders 2010). However, social 
constructivism, regardless of its many manifestations, is susceptible to the charge of over-
determination, that is, of exaggerating the power of the discourse to define its subjects. The 
subjugated are presumed to be powerless in resisting and countering the dominant discourse: 
“the agency of the postcolonial is… obliterated in order to inscribe him and her as marginal” 
(Spivak 1990; also Bhabha 1994; Guha 1982-89; Hall 1980). Stuart Hall (1988) insists, 
however, that “the ideological sign is always multi-accentual… it can be discursively 
rearticulated to construct new meanings, connect with different social practices, and position 
social subjects differently.” Homi Bhabha (1994) points to the “subversive strategy of 
subaltern agency that negotiates its own authority through a process of iterative ‘unpicking’ 
and incommensurable, insurgent relinking.” Edward Said (1994) found such critique of this 
neglect of the “subaltern” so incisive that he was moved to pen a sequel volume to 
Orientalism that explored resistance. Islamophobia Studies (much of it inspired by Said) needs 
to follow his example and investigate subalternity in greater depth. 
This essay examines resistance to Islamophobia in the form of Europhobia produced 
by Islamists in Europe. By “Europhobia” I mean essentializing and distorting depictions of 
Europe (and the West) as thoroughly decadent, corrupt, and sadistic. In a process that I dub 
“inverted othering” Islamists emulate the discursive strategies of Islamophobes but invert 
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their negative stereotypes of Muslims to portray (non-Muslim) Europeans as a menacing 
threat to the umma, or Arabic community. It can also be useful to think of this resistance as 
reverse moral panic, whereby “moral panic” represents the process by which opportunistic 
political agents manage to stigmatize a targeted group in such a way that the group’s 
purported moral deviance becomes convincingly portrayed as an existential threat to the 
community as a whole (Cohen 1980; also see Morgan and Poynting 2012; Bahners 2011). 
Moral panics tend to take place largely in the realm of symbolic politics, having little or no 
basis in fact. 
I spotlight three forms of “inverted othering” through systematic comparison of 
both Islamophobic and Europhobic discourse in Europe (including in cyberspace): Islamists 
invert the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy by contending that European 
democracy is a hypocritical sham when it comes to equal rights for Muslims; Islamists invert 
the claim that Islam is misogynistic by arguing that Europe sexualizes and thereby represses 
women; Islamists invert the claim that Islam is inherently expansionist by insisting that 
Europe continues to harbor (neo)imperialist aims and attitudes toward the Islamic World. 
“Inverted othering” generates and disseminates a powerful subaltern discourse that moves 
many Muslims in Europe to resist their subjugation in myriad ways. 
For all its power and influence in moving Muslims to resistance, however, 
Europhobic discourse remains limited by Islamophobia nonetheless. Following Spivak 
(1988), I contend that Europhobic “inverted othering” remains, to an important extent, 
informed by, or confined within, the binary logic of Islamophobia. “Inverted othering” 
opens only very specific and limited iterations of resistance, while obscuring other arguably 
more useful challenges to Islamophobic stereotypes that emanate from what Bhabha (1994) 
has called the hybrid “third space of enunciation.”  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
I focus on the three themes because they are the most salient. The claim that Islam, 
and by extension, Muslims, are anti-democratic, is commonly heard on both the political 
Right and Left. Moreover, its broad distribution has influenced the proliferation across 
Europe of mandatory integration tests, civics courses, and loyalty oaths targeted specifically 
at European Muslims (Goodman 2014; Groot, Kuipers and Weber 2009). The veil 
controversy has been in the headlines regularly since 1989 when three pupils of Moroccan 
heritage who refused to unveil were expelled by administrators of Gabriel Havez Secondary 
School. Burqa, niqab or hijab bans have been enacted in countries such as France, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Turkey (Korteweg and 
Yurdakul 2014; Rosenberger and Sauer 2012; O’Brien 2009). The salience of Islamic 
expansionism manifests itself in the enormous amount of both rhetoric and policymaking 
addressing alleged Islamist terrorism despite the fact that it regularly amounts to under three 
percent of failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks in Europe (Europol 2013, 2012, 2011, 
2010; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). 
By “Islamophobes,” I mean public opinion leaders (politicians, activists, journalists, 
scholars) who are keen to make and distribute critical assessments of Islam. However, to 
qualify as “Islamophobic” in this essay, their allegations need to be reductionist and 
essentializing. They have to claim implicitly or explicitly that whatever negative trait they crit-
icize (for example, tyranny, or misogyny) is inherent to Islam, and can therefore, justifiably 
be suspected of most or all devout Muslims. Furthermore, in this article, Islamophobes, for 
the most part, are not degree-holding specialists on Islam and would appear to be 
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uninterested in learning from the abundant literature now available that plainly refutes 
reductionist allegations regarding Islam and Muslims (see O’Brien 2015; Schneiders 2010). 
I focus on Europhobic pronouncements from Islamists because I am interested in 
their resistance to the dominant discourse. I employ the admittedly imperfect term 
“Islamism” loosely and broadly to envelop the beliefs of all those who strive toward a 
society in which Islamic precepts and laws—typically understood as those enunciated in the 
Qur’an and Sunna—predominate. Among those I label “Islamists,” the general idea tends to 
prevail that God revealed, through the Prophet Muhammad (and by some accounts certain 
subsequent Hadiths as well), sufficient guidelines for leading a morally upstanding life as an 
individual and as a community in all times and places. They view and practice “Islam as a 
way of life” (a common slogan among Islamists) rather than a private spiritual confession 
(Maréchal 2008). Because of limited space, I gloss over the significant differences in strategy 
for achieving the Islamist goal—differences ranging from pietist personal conversion 
stressed by such groups as Tablighi Jamaat (Association for the Propagation of Islam), Jamaat 
Nur, the Süleymanli, and the Gülen Movement, to non-violent political action practiced by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its European affiliate the Union of Islamic Organizations in 
Europe (UOIE), the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG), the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB) or the Jamaat-i Islami, to jihadist militant organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
Supporters of Shariah, Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya, and Groupe 
Islamique Armé. The connections among Islamist organizations are typically informal and 
often strained. Yet, they all tend to see themselves working in the service of the international 
umma, or Arabic community (Pargeter 2008). As a leader of the United Kingdom Islamic 
Mission (UKIM) remarked, “We belong to the international Islamic movement, neither to 
Jama’at, nor to Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] nor to the [Islamist] Refah party in Turkey—but 
all of them are our friends” (quoted in Vidino 2006). But let the reader be forewarned that 
Islamist (not to mention Islamic) doctrine and practice are highly complex and evolving 
phenomena, full treatment of which would demand a separate volume (Mandaville 2014; 
Leiken 2012; Göle 2011; Roy 2005). 
 
TYRANNY 
 
One of the commonest Islamophobic tropes maintains that Islam (and by extension 
devout Muslims) is undemocratic. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for example, avers that anyone who takes 
Muhammad as their moral guide to action is bound to reject democracy. She has called the 
Prophet a “perverted tyrant whose teachings cannot be reconciled with democracy.” Listed 
by Time (18 April 2005) as one of the “100 most influential persons in the world,” Hirsi Ali 
has been but one of a chorus of prominent opinion leaders, including Afshin Elian, Chadortt 
Djavann, André Glucksmann, Emmanuell Todd, Oriana Fallaci, Necla Kelek, Alice 
Schwarzer, Helmut Schmidt, Ralph Giordano, Melanie Phillips, Roy Jenkins, and Niall 
Ferguson, who insist that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Hirsi Ali’s erstwhile 
political partner in the Dutch parliament, Geert Wilders, went so far as to liken the Qur’an 
to Mein Kampf. Prominent French intellectual Bernhard Henri Lévy uses the catachresis 
“fascislamist,” while Le Figaro columnist Yvan Rioufol prefers “nazislamist” (both quoted in 
Rigoni 2007). British columnist Christopher Hitchins spoke of “fascism with an Islamic 
face” (Slate 22 October 2007), and the best-selling Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci of “the 
new Nazi-Fascism” (quoted in New Yorker 5 June 2006). 
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The incompatibility indictment, versions of which frequently appear on any number 
of Islamophobic websites such as Islam Watch, Politically Incorrect, Die Grüne Pest, Nürnberg 2.0, 
Racisme anti-blanc, Reposte Laique, Stop the Islamization of Europe, Nuke all Mosques, Islam versus 
Europe, Pro-Reconquista-Europa, The Brussels Journal, Jihad Watch, or Gates of Vienna, typically 
asserts something like the following: Both the Qur’an and the Prophet command followers 
to submit to the will of God. After all, “Islam” is derived from the Arabic root s-l-m, which 
connotes “submission,” as the 2004 film Submission written by Hirsi Ali and directed by Theo 
Van Gogh emphasizes. In her best-selling The Rage and the Pride, Fallaci says Islam “has never 
wanted to know about freedom and democracy and progress.” The creed’s insistence on 
submission is said to foster a “slave mentality” (Kelek 2005) among Muslims that makes 
them dubious, if not inimical, toward individual liberty, the moral cornerstone of democracy. 
German sociologist of Turkish background and winner of Bavaria’s prestigious Geschwister-
Scholl prize for courage in the name of liberty, Necla Kelek (2005), asks doubtingly: “Is a 
culture capable of democracy that denies to the individual the right of self-determination?” 
Similarly, Giordano “doubts whether anyone who considers holy this charter of a herdmen’s 
culture can abide by the [German] constitution” (quoted in Bahners 2011). 
Islamist Europhobes invert this argument by asserting that the European 
“democracies” are themselves anti-democratic, at least when it comes to Muslims. For 
example, Abou Jahjah, leader of the Antwerp-based Arab-European League, complains: 
"We're Belgian citizens but they treat us like foreigners. The whole system is rigged to 
exclude us from jobs, houses and everything" (The Telegraph 29 November 2002). Similarly, 
Al-Islam, the journal of the Munich Islamic Center, charges: “In a society where the majority 
of the population—and nearly all politicians—are critical of or reject Islam, one cannot 
expect Muslims to enjoy real freedom” (quoted in Meining 2012: 228). IGMG “reminds that 
the majority of Muslims in Europe are excluded from direct democratic participation” and 
presents itself as “supporting the socially disadvantaged and oppressed” 
(www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft/wir-ueber-uns). Abdul Wahid, Chairman of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Britain, claims, “the government’s long-term objective is to manufacture a compliant, 
subdued, secular Muslim community in Britain” (quoted in Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011). 
Despite pretensions of liberty, equality, and tolerance in Western democracies, the 
truth, according to Islamists, is that Muslims and the values dear to them are under relentless 
attack. Kalim Siddiqui, who founded the Muslim Parliament UK in 1989, charged that “post-
Christian secular society,” including “the British Government,” seeks “to destroy our values” 
(quoted in Kepel 1997). Jahjah talks of “Flemish cultural terrorism” against the Islamic 
community of Belgium (The Telegraph 29 November 2002). Similarly, before being deported 
from Germany to Turkey in 2004, Metin Kaplan, the self-proclaimed Caliph of Cologne, 
complained that “the enemies of Islam assume they can attack our religion, beliefs, and 
worship and we Muslims keep silent like sheep” (quoted in Yükleyen 2012). In response to 
France’s 2004 ban on veiling in public schools, Abdullah Ben Masour, General Secretary of 
the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), criticized the French state for 
portraying “a twelve-year-old child… like an enemy… just because she wants to do her own 
thing” (quoted in Koopmans et. al., 2005).
 
This complaint of the relentless and systematic 
oppression of European Muslims has, for at least two decades, represented a major theme in 
the lyrics of hugely popular Islamist hip-hop and rap artists such as IAM (Imperial Asiatic 
Men), Islamic Force, Lala Man, 3ème CEil, Fun-Da-Mental, Mecca2Medina, Pearls of Islam, 
or Yazid. The latter sings: 
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I’m the Arab, stopping oppression is my mission. 
The country of secularism doesn’t tolerate Islam 
Unemployment ravages, they talk of immigration 
And when the banlieue burns, they talk of integration. 
(Quoted in Jenkins 2007; also see Aidi 2014) 
 
Western governments and media are also said to engage in mendacious humbug 
regarding Muslims, despite lip service paid to the democratic value of truthfulness. The 
rapidly proliferating jihadist websites typically style themselves as alternative sources of news 
and information to the “lies or misconceptions that are present in Kuffar (infidel) sources 
such as the BBC or CNN,” to quote almuhajiroun.com (quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005). The 
most outlandish recrimination claims that Western governments themselves commit the 
terrorist attacks spuriously attributed to Muslims. The commonest accusation in this regard 
is that the 9/11 attacks were either orchestrated or faked by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(or in some accounts by or with the Israeli Mossad). In his 2002 book, Naal bou la France 
(Damn France), Farid Abdelkrim, president of Jeunes Musulmans de France, denounced France 
as a neocolonial power that conspired with the West to commit the 9/11 atrocities and pin 
them on Osama Bin Laden (also see Leiken 2012; Schiffauer 2010; Wiktorowicz 2005; 
Werbner 2004). Similar allegations have been made about, for example, Britain’s MI5 (Secret 
Intelligence Service) and the London Tube bombings of 2005 (Leiken 2012; Jenkins 2007). 
IGMG alleged that Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses was actually published by the CIA 
(Laurence 2012). It testifies to the power of persuasion that the jihadist websites and other 
publications possess, for which a Pew (2006) survey found that 56 percent of polled British, 
46 percent of polled French and 44 percent of polled German Muslims refuse to believe that 
Arabs were involved in the 9/11 attacks. Likewise, half of the 500 British Muslims surveyed 
for Channel Four News (4 June 2007) believe that the government trumped up charges against 
the convicted Tube bombers; a quarter maintain that the government itself masterminded 
the attacks. 
 
MISOGYNY 
 
One of the Islam-bashers’ favorite accusations against Islam and Muslims is that they 
are misogynistic. Predictably, Muhammad is said to bear much of the blame. Particularly 
virulent scorn is poured on his consummated marriage to nine-year-old Aisha. On the 
Internet one can frequently come across such slurs as “Muhammad the Pedophile” 
(wikiislam.net), “rapist” (western-civilization.com), and “child-fucker” (Kinderficker) (pi-
news.net). Select verses are typically plucked from the Qur’an and quoted out of context to 
demonstrate Islam’s supposed disdain for women: 
 
The Quran in Sura 4:11 says: “The share of a male shall be twice that of a female”… 
The Quran in Sura 4:34 says: “If you fear highhandedness from your wives, remind 
them [of the teaching of God], then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit 
them…” (infidelsarecool.com) 
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Rather than acknowledge that consummated marriages with girls at puberty have 
been a common practice in many cultures, including Christian ones, or that misogynistic 
lines abound in the Bible (for instance, Genesis, 3: 16), opportunistic Islamophobes proffer 
the essentialist argument that the Prophet’s words and deeds have fostered an Islamic 
doctrine and culture that make all pious Muslims prone to oppress women. French feminist 
Elisabeth Altschull (1995) does concede that “all religions have their oppressive aspects 
toward women,” but immediately adds that “none [but Islam] has gone so far, is as 
systematic, or is as explicit about the inferior status of women willed and created by god.” 
Kelek (2007), the author of the 2005 bestseller Die fremde Braut (The Foreign Bride), alleges that 
“political Islam wants… to establish an Apartheid of the sexes in free European societies,” 
whereby “women in public don’t have the right to be human” (quoted in Cesari 2013). In 
her book The Caged Virgin, Hirsi Ali (2006) excoriates Islam for endorsing “a stifling morality 
that makes Muslim men the owners of women.” The most pessimistic of these caricatures 
depict Muslim women so firmly oppressed by, and socialized to, gender inequality that even 
they cannot be relied on to fight for emancipation, unless, that is, they abandon Islam 
altogether. Thus, Hirsi Ali (2006) avers: 
 
Because they have internalized their subordination, they no longer experience it as an 
oppression by an external force but as a strong internal shield… They are like 
prisoners suffering from Stockholm syndrome, in which hostages fall in love with 
the hostage takers and establish a deep intimate contact with them. 
 
It speaks to the widespread influence of this trope that the Stasi Commission (tasked 
with recommending whether to ban veiling in French public schools in 2004) refused to hear 
public testimony from veiled women on grounds that their views could not possibly be 
autonomous. Likewise, the legislator who introduced Italy’s bill, the Moroccan-born member 
of Premier Silvio Berlusconi's PDL, Souad Sbai, justified the measure on grounds that “we 
have to help women get out of this segregation… to get out of this submission. I want to 
speak for those who don't have a voice, who don't have the strength to yell and say, 'I am 
not doing well’" (Huffington Post 2 August 2011). 
Many opponents of veiling seem keen to test the limits of credulity. In the public 
letter that arguably elevated the headscarf debate from low to high politics in 1989, five 
prominent French intellectuals, including Alain Finkielkraut, Elisabeth Badinter, Régis 
Debray, Elisabeth de Fontenay, and Catherine Kintzler, likened the town where the 
controversy began, Creil, to Munich in 1938 (the “Munich of the republican school”) and 
implored French educators not to repeat the fateful error of appeasement committed by 
Neville Chamberlain with Hitler (Le Nouvel Observateur 2 November 1989). Thus were three 
teenaged girls (and no more than an estimated 2000 veiled pupils in the whole of France) 
equated with the bellicose chancellor of a mighty nation-state poised to invade and occupy 
France. The analogy to the Nazis is common. For instance, Chahadortt Djavann (2004), an 
Iranian novelist domiciled in Paris, has compared the veil to the yellow star forced upon 
Jews under the Nazi regime; so too has prominent German feminist Alice Schwarzer 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 4 July 2006). Likewise, President Sarkozy’s eventual Minister 
for Urban Renewal, Fadela Amara, described the hijab as “an instrument of oppression that 
is imposed by the green [meaning Islamist] fascists” (quoted in Jenkins 2007). 
“Systematic exaggeration” (Bahners 2011) has extended beyond veiling to other 
issues affecting female Muslims. So-called “honor killings” of Muslim women who have 
allegedly disgraced their family by consorting with non-Muslims, for example, Fadime 
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Sahindal (Sweden 2002), Ghazal Khan (Denmark 2003), Schijman Kuashi (Netherlands 
2005), Hatan Sürücü (Germany 2005) and Banaz Mahmod Babakir Agha (Britain 2007), have 
received much sensationalized media coverage and political commentary (Korteweg and 
Yurdakul 2013; Fredette 2014). In the case of Sürücü, experts on gender and Islam published 
an open letter criticizing Islam critics Serap Çileli, Seyran Ateş and Necla Kelek for 
deliberately exaggerating and exploiting the case in an effort to advance their personal 
Islamophobic agendas (Terkessidis and Karakaşoğlu 2006). The film La Squale (2000) and 
the book Dans l’enfer des tournantes (translated into English as To Hell and Back) by Samira Bellil 
(2002) focused French national attention on the arresting problem of gang-rape among 
Muslims in the banlieues, when, in fact, the despicable act transpires in non-Muslim circles as 
well (Muchielli 2005). Burned Alive, the 2005 best-selling French memoir of a woman who 
survived being doused with gasoline and set ablaze by her brother, appears to have been 
largely fabricated with the assistance of writer and promoter Marie-Thérèse Cuny, who 
“assisted” at least two other women in similar fashion (Abu-Lughod 2013). So-called “forced 
marriages” have also become media flashpoints through popular books such as Brick Lane 
(Ali 2004), Die Fremde Braut (Kelek 2005) and The Caged Virgin (Hirsi Ali 2006), which depict 
real or fictional accounts of young women dragooned into marrying men whom they 
despise. In reality, however, the overwhelming majority of arranged marriages result from 
negotiations freely entered into by the bride and groom with their parents (Roy 2007). 
Islamists invert the image of subjugated female Muslims by spotlighting the 
purportedly rampant objectification and sexualization of women in Europe. Thus the Union 
for Islamic Development and Culture in Bulgaria laments that “women can be seen in the 
streets dressed in clothes that barely cover their underwear (and this is taken as normal)… 
[trying] to appear as sexually attractive as possible… and disappointed if no one turns their 
head to look at them” (quoted in Ghodsee 2012). Al-Muhajiroun claims that in British secular 
schools “children are taught to conform to a code of dress that shows their nakedness…. 
Children grow up idolizing pop-stars and footballers rather than appreciating the Messengers 
from their creator and worshiping God alone” (quoted in Wiktorowicz 2005). The 
preoccupation with women and girls as sex objects is typically made to mushroom into 
myriad additional problems that are said to plague Western women’s lives. In her study of 
the Swedish journal Salaam, for instance, Jonas Otterbeck (2000: 259) found that: 
 
Swedish (or Western) women is a recurrent theme. The Swedish woman… is 
described as a victim of several powers. She is exploited by commercialism, especially 
by the fashion industry. She is overworked and underpaid, has a full-time job and all 
the housework. She never has time for her children who will end up on the streets, 
which will lead them to self-destruction, drugs, crimes, and a high suicide rate. Her 
marriage will eventually break down and lead to divorce due to [sic] unrealistic hopes 
built on the first moments of love and passion in the relationship. 
 
Just as the image of subjugated female Muslims self-servingly implies that European 
women are liberated, the portrayal of the latter as sinfully unchaste and wantonly over-sexed 
is coded to suggest superior virtue among pious Muslims. Veiling, for example, is exalted as 
a necessary safeguard against perilous Westernization. Fereshta Ludin, the woman at the 
center of Germany’s headscarf controversy, insisted that her veil ensured “protection against 
Western decadence” (quoted in Oestreich 2004). Muslims are warned that removing the veil 
in public represents the first capricious step down a treacherous path ineluctably leading to 
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mundane profanity and eternal damnation. Thus, German Salafist Ibrahim Abou-Nagie 
warns that unveiled women will land in hell (www.diewahrereligion.de). One Internet meme 
that has found wide distribution depicts a veiled woman ascending a staircase to heaven, the 
unveiled, secularly clad woman descending a staircase into hell. Unveiling is further said to 
invite harassment from lascivious Western men, which will either lead to rape or, worse, 
consorting and fornicating with them which, in turn, will alienate the wayward women from 
their true family and community. Typically, verses from the Qur’an will be cited to 
emphasize divine injunction: "O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing 
women, that they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when outside): that 
they should be known (as such) and not molested" (Qur’an 33:59). Such purported Qur’anic 
approbation is reinforced by an abundance of popular, alarmist film and fiction widely 
distributed among Muslim immigrants that dramatize stories of unsuspecting Muslim 
daughters and wives lured from chastity and piety into depravity and ruin by mischievous 
European playboys (Gerlach 2006).  
 
EMPIRE 
 
Islamophobes warn that Islam is inherently expansionist. Muhammad is said to have 
cast the mold by establishing an army of holy warriors in Medina that went on to wage jihad 
against the infidels controlling Mecca. On the website islamwatch.org, for instance, Hirsi Ali 
alleged: 
 
Muhammad built the House of Islam using military tactics that included mass killing, 
torture, targeted assassination, lying and the indiscriminate destruction of productive 
goods… a close look at the propaganda produced by the terrorists [of today] reveals 
constant quotation of Muhammad’s deeds and edicts to justify their actions and to 
call on other Muslims to support their cause. (Hirsi Ali 2006) 
 
Of course, such expansionist militancy was attributed to the prophet not only in the 
controversial cartoon published by Jylland-Postens in 2005, but also in the notorious 
Regensburg speech of 2006, in which Pope Benedict XVI (2006), quoting an erstwhile 
Byzantine emperor, referred to Muhammad’s “command to spread by sword the faith he 
preached.” Many maintain that the Muslims have their covetous eyes set on Europe. Such 
charges often point to verses in the Qur’an that purportedly command believers to exercise 
violence. Favorites (often taken out of context) state: “When you encounter the unbelievers 
strike off their heads” (47:4); or “Slay them wherever ye find them and drive them out of the 
places whence they drove you out” (2:191-93). It should come as no great surprise, then, 
claims Niall Ferguson that “a youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the 
Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe” 
(quoted in Saunders 2012). “Wake up, people,” thundered Fallaci following 9/11, “what is 
under way here is a reverse crusade… They will feel authorized to kill you and your children 
because you drink wine or beer, because you don’t wear a long beard or chador, because you 
go the theatre and cinemas, because you listen to music and sing songs” (quoted in Kaya 
2012). Søren Krarup warns of “the slow extermination of the Danish people” (quoted in 
Hedetoft 2003), while Melanie Phillips (2007) contends that “the job of subjugating the West 
is half done” and is being carried out by a “lethal and many-headed hydra” of Al-Qaeda 
affiliates in Europe. Alice Schwarzer (2002), whose 2002 bestseller was titled The Holy 
Warriors and the Misguided Tolerance, drew the predictable comparison to the Nazis: “The 
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parallels to 1933 are emerging…The holy warriors have already made Italy their logistical 
basis, England their propoganda center and Germany their European hub.” Elsewhere, she 
warned that the Islamists “have already won an unsettling amount of terrain and 
unfortunately can no longer be stopped with democratic measures alone” (quoted in 
Bahners 2011: 246). Sorbonne history professor Guy Millière (2004) went so far as to claim 
that the Muslim question “will determine whether France survives or perishes" in the 
twenty-first century. There would appear to be no limit to the number of politicians 
(including: Enoch Powell, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider, Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, Filip 
Dewinter, Siv Jensen, and Nigel Farage) who catapult themselves to political popularity by 
haranguing against the “Islamization” of Europe. The same holds for the ambition of large 
numbers of authors who make bestseller lists with books purporting to expose the designs 
of radical Muslim cells to transform Europe into “Eurabia” (Y’oer 2005; also Marchand 
2013; Ulfkotte 2013; Broder 2006; Besson 2005). Likewise, Islamophobic websites abound 
that deploy captivating graphs and images depicting the impending Islamization of Europe. 
One YouTube video with more than 1 million hits features a reconfigured map of “Europe 
2015” on which France has been renamed “The Islamic Republic of New Algeria,” The 
United Kingdom “North Pakistan,” Germany “New Turkey,” and so on 
(youtube.com/watch?v=wiLdDe7Eha4; accessed 12 July 2012). A Pro-Reconquista-Europa 
headline from 22 July 2014 read: “Madrid to Fall [to jihadists] in 2020” (forum.pro-
reconquista-europa.com/viewtopic.php?f=93&t=2267); the headline at Islam versus Europe 
from 16 June 2014 was: “Black flag of Jihad Will Fly over London.” Given the nigh ubiquity 
of anti-Islam hyperbole, it should come as no surprise that more than two-thirds of those 
polled in France, Britain, the US, and Germany “are worried about Islamic extremists in 
their country” (Pew 2012). 
 Eurohostile Islamists retort that it is Europe (the West) that is imperialist. Echoing a 
theme common in postcolonial studies (Fanon 1965; Said 1978; Nandy 1988), Islamists 
contend that, since the Crusades, Europe and the West have harbored and realized (neo) 
imperialist designs on the Orient. Regularly invoking conspiracy theory, self-appointed 
“cyber-imams” point the finger at the USA, Israel, and their allies in Europe as today’s 
“Crusaders and Zionists” (quoted in Scientific Council, 2006; also Kepel 2004; Wiktorowicz 
2005; and Leiken 2012). Although Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain condemned the Boston Marathon 
bombing of 2013, it urged visitors to its website to consider the larger context: 
Just in the past decade, in a highly charged post 9-11 world, the USA and its allies 
have committed numerous heinous crimes against Muslims. Whether one looks at 
the Guantanamo Bay, the deaths of Iraqis on false pretences [sic], the systematic 
destruction of Afghanistan since 2002, the drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia, the attack and intervention in Mali, overt support for Israel’s crimes in 
Palestine, tacit support for India’s crimes in Kashmir, silence and complicity over 
Russian thuggery in the North Caucasus, the backing of vicious dictators in the 
Muslim world or the tacit support for Bashar Al-Assad in Syria until recently, one 
will see genuine causes for grief, anger and emotion… (www.hizb.org.uk/current-
affiars/boston-bombings). 
 
ISIS has successfully recruited thousands of European Muslims to join its ranks with 
contentions such as: “Oh Americans, and oh Europeans, the Islamic State did not initiate a 
war against you as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who 
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started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great 
price” (CNN 22 September 2014). Islamist social media tend to portray Western foreign 
policy as nothing short of a thinly veiled crusade bent on destroying Islam. Typically, 
physical injuries to innocent women and children allegedly inflicted by Western government 
action are highlighted and depicted, not as unintended and regretted, but rather as deliberate 
and wanton (Leiken 2012 ; Pargeter 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005; Kepel 2004). By contrast, 
jihadists are one-dimensionally lionized as heroic defenders of Islam, miraculously 
overcoming tremendous odds to triumph over the Western persecutors (Awan 2007; 
Sageman 2008). The numbers of supporters of the jihadist movements are also typically 
inflated several fold (Wiktorowicz 2005). 
Whether true or false, such fulminations can and do influence European Muslims. 
For example, Mohammed Bouyeri, murderer of Theo van Gogh and member of the so-
called “Hofstad Network” of alleged terrorists, claimed: 
 
There are dark Satanic forces that have sown their seed of evil everywhere in the 
world. This seed has been sown in the Islamic world in the times of colonialism…. 
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire… the enemies of Islam have been active in 
gradually carrying out their plans aiming at the total destruction of Islam. (Quoted in 
Peters 2011) 
 
Omar Bakri, who headed the British group Al-Muhajiroun, said in 2004 that aggressive 
Western foreign policy had earned Western nations “a 9/11 day after day after day” (quoted 
in Aidi 2014). London Tube bomber Shehzad Tanweer justified his actions thusly: “Your 
government continues to oppress our women and children, our brothers and sisters in 
Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya” (youtube.com/watch?v=FG6a26uX1eA). 
Likewise, Michael Adebolajo, who cut down British soldier Lee Rigby with a machete in 
2013, claimed: “Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers… We swear by Allah… we will 
never stop fighting you until you leave us alone” (youtube.com/watch?v=WxrtaHkyw5w). 
The Madrid bombers are said to have been significantly influenced by the Internet text Iraqi 
Jihad: Hopes and Dangers, which recommended strategic rail bombings in Spain to prompt its 
withdrawal from the US-led occupation of Iraq (Awan 2007). The Moroccan-German 
Chouka brothers, who grew up in Bonn but now reside in the borderlands between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, regularly send internet videos from the camp of the International 
Mujahadeen Uzbekistan exhorting Germans, in German, to commit acts of terrorism against 
trains, shopping centers, restaurants, and discotheques in Germany. In one video from 2011 
entitled Evil Fatherland (Böses Vaterland), Mounir promises that “there must and will be, God 
willing, a series of attacks against the German people” in retaliation for the injustices its 
government has perpetrated against Muslims in Afghanistan. In subsequent videos, such as 
Yes, We Are Terrorists, the brothers praise Arid Uka and Mohammad Merah (“the knight of 
Toulouse”) as exemplary Muslims whose murderous deeds merit emulation (Spiegel Online 23 
May 2012). For his part, Merah claimed to be motivated by French involvement in 
Afghanistan, the burqa ban, and Israel’s persecution of Palestinians: “The Jews kill our 
brothers and sisters in Palestine” (Telegraph 10 April 2012). Amedy Coulibaly, who killed four 
hostages in Paris in 2015, complained of the wrongful persecution of ISIS: “They need to 
stop bombing ISIS” (CNN 11 January 2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
In her widely read article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak (1988) casts doubt on 
identifying and hearing an authentic subaltern voice completely free of the influence of the 
dominant Eurocentric discourse. Europhobia is counter-hegemonic to be sure, but it 
remains informed by Islamophobia. “Inverted othering” locks Islamist discourse into the 
binary logic of Islamophobia that juxtaposes Islam and Europe as utterly different (or, 
“other”) and irrevocably at odds. Europhobia portrays Europe (the West) as wholly evil, as 
well as incapable of reform. The binary logic plainly manifests itself in the notion of 
“Westoxification,” originally coined by the Iranian intellectual Jalal al-e Ahmad, but widely 
circulated by and among European Islamists. Any and all contact with Europeans is 
discouraged, lest the pious Muslim become infected with their evil thoughts and deeds. 
 Binary logic impedes the emergence of hybrid voices from Bhabha’s (1994) “Third 
Space.” hankfully, such voices do exist. They can be heard, for example, from what some 
scholars label “post-Islamists” (Mandaville 2014; Schiffauer 2010; Roy 1998). I adopt the 
admittedly less-than-perfect label to refer to a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and 
activists in search of a “fusion of religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty 
[that] transcend[s] Islamism by building a pious society with a civil nonreligious state” (Bayat 
2013). Although their critique of many aspects of modern Western societies is unmistakably 
informed by the thought of earlier Islamists such as Qutb or Maududi, post-Islamists eschew 
the wholesale rejection of Western society associated with both the Islamist pioneers as well 
as their contemporary orthodox adherents. “I don't deny my Muslim roots,” claims Tariq 
Ramadan, “but I don't vilify Europe either" (Time 11 December 2000). Though the grandson 
of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al Banna, Ramadan (2010) chides European 
Muslims for falling prey to “simplistic versions of ‘us versus them’” that teaches “you are 
more Muslim when you are against the West.” Ramadan’s celebrity notwithstanding, post-
Islamist voices, like the ecumenically oriented voices of some non-Muslim Europeans who 
resist a wholesale rejection of Islam and even Islamism (Schiffauer 2010; Roy 2005), 
continue to go largely unheard, drowned out by the din of nigh ubiquitous Islamophobic and 
Europhobic demagoguery. 
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